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IN TI IE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBYN MICHELLE HOGG AN. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RANEE BOLEY FLEMING aka RENEE 
B. FLEMING, KAREN B. GAMONAL 
aka KAREN HALTERMAN, JOYCE H. 
CROCKETT, JOHN D. HOGGAN, LEO 
V. JOLLEY, ROSALEE J. KEELE aka 
ROSALEE M. HASLAM, THE 
ESTATE OP KRISTE H. STREET, THE 
ESTATE OF ELIZABETH D. JOLLEY 
GARDNER aka ELIZABETH DUNCAN j 
JOLLEY, aka ELIZAEETII DUNCAN, 
and JOHN DOES 1-100, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
District Court No.070902181. 
Appellate No. 20090399 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Final Order Granting Defendants/Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss, of the Utah Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Denisc P. Liiidberg presiding. Jurisdiction to hear (his appeal is confened 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
1 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err when it found that a quit claim deed executed by 
Elizabeth D. Jolley aka Elizabeth D. JoHey Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan to transfer title 
to Elizabeth D. Jolley aka Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan and Jolin D. 
Hoggan in joint tenancy, wliich was duly recorded in 1991, did not convey any interest to 
John D, Hoggan a married man, and subsequently granted Defendants' motion to 
dismiss? 
Standard of Review: Under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), the court may dismiss if "(1) 
the claimant has tailed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, or 
(2) the triai court is not persuaded by that evidence." Grosser! v. DeSYitt, 1999 UT App. 
167 If 8, 982 P.2d 581 (quoting, Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 340 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)). When a court sits as tact finder, it "may weigh the evidence, consider 
credibility, and dismiss if it finds that although plaintiffs evidence establishes a prima 
facie ease in the technical sense, it is unpersuasive." Grossen, 1999 UT App. 167, % 9. 
Courts "'give great weight to the findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial 
judge,* and reverse those findings only if clearly erroneous," Id. at f 10 quoting Southern 
Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App, 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules arc relevant to this 
appeal: 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statutes: 
i. Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-13 (2009) 
A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance 
of all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein 
described and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of 
the conveyance. 
2. Utah Code Ann+ § 57-1 -5 (2)(a) and (3)(a) and (b) (2009) 
(2) (a) Use of words "joint tenancy" or "with rights of survivorship" or "and to the 
survivor of them" or words of similar import means a joint tenancy, 
(3) A sole owner of real property creates a joint tenancy in himself and another or others; 
(a) by making a transfer to himself and another or others as joint tenants by use of the 
words as provided in Subsection (2)(a); or (b) hy conveying to another person or persons 
an interest in land in which an interest is retained by the grantor and by declaring the 
creation of a joint tenancy by use of the words as provided in Subsection (2)(a)> 
3. UfakCode Annotated §57-3-103 (2009) 
Effect of failure to record. Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the 
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duty recorded. 
4. Utah code Annotated § 574a-4( 1 )(a) and (d) (2009) 
3 
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A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the reai 
properly affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to 
execute it; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dales on the document 
and the date of recording, 
Rules: 
1, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal ail record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding
 +, , 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about October 22s 1991 the then owner of real property located at 687 East 
3ul Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84103, (the "rcal property") Elizabeth D. Joiley aka 
Elizabeth D, Joiley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan ("Elizabeth D. Joiley Gardner"), 
transferred her interest in the real property to Elizabeth D. Joiley aka Elizabeth D- Joiley 
Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan and Defendant John D. T-Toggan by way of a document 
tilled Quit-Claim Deed as Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship. R, at 241 -242, * 
(See also Trial Exhibit " 1 " a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). That 
1
 There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court 
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R, page number." The Transcript 
of Proceedings shall be referred to as 'Tr. Page number," 
4 
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quitclaim deed was recorded with the Salt T,akc County Recorder's Office on October 23, 
1991. Trial Exhibit 1. 
On March 2nd'2003, Elizabeth D. Joiley Gardner passed away. R. at 243. 
Subsequent to her death, on or about November 19, 2003 a document was 
recorded entitled, Quit-Claim Deed, regarding the real property. R, at 244. (See also Trial 
Exhibit "3" a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "E"). This document 
allegedly transferred interest in the real property to RaNec Bolcy Fleming. Karen B. 
Gamonal, Joyce FL Crockett, Kriste II. Street, Jon D. Hoggan, Leo V. Joiley, and Rosalec 
J. Kccle, as tenants in common. R. at 244 and Trial Exhibit 3. This Quit-Claim Deed is 
dated December 11, 1978, but until November 19,2003 had not been recorded. R. at 225, 
244 and Trial Exhibit 3. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, in mid lor Salt Lake 
County, Stale of Utah, on Februaty 7, 2007, asking the trial court primarily to quiet title 
as to the two deeds. See R. at 1-17. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed on 
March 28,2007, See R a t 20-36. 
A bench trial was held before Honorable Denise P. Lindberg to quiet title to the 
real property located at 687 East 3rd Avenue, Salt I,akc City, Utah, 84103 on December 3, 
2008. R. at 239. The trial court granted Respondents motion to dismiss at the end of 
Petitioners case hi chief, Tr, at 49. 2-25 and 50; 1-17, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were signed and entered April 14, 2009 and entered on April 15, 2009. R. at 239-
248. in those findings^  the trial court found: 
5 
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13. Thai the placing of Defendant John Hoggan 's name on the title to 
the America First Credit Union was not intended to convey art interest to 
the property to Defendant John lloggan and Defendant John Hoggan's 
mother's [sic] had previously executed a Quit Claim Deed to the home and 
real property conveying the property to "Ranee Botey Fleming, Karen B. 
Gamonal, Joyce II. Crockett, Kriste II. Street, John D. Hoggan, Leo V. 
Jolley, and Rosalee J. Keele, as tenants in common," 
R. at 242 (emphasis added). 
The trial court determined that the deed executed on October 23, 1991 was not 
intended to convey a real property interest to Defendant John Hoggan, R at 246. Based 
on that finding, the trial court concluded that the "Estate [of Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner] 
is the legal owner" of the real property at issue. R, at 247. A Notice of Appeal was filed 
on May 7,2009, R. at 250-251. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant John lloggan were married on July 14,1978. R. at 240. 
Subsequently they moved to a home owned by Defendant Jolin Hoggan's mother, 
Elizabeth D, Joilcy Gardner, located at 687 East 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84103. 
R. at 241. PlainliiTj Defendant John Hoggan and his mother sought a loan to make 
needed repairs to the properly, R. at 241. The bank refused to lend the money unless an 
interest in the real property was conveyed to Defendant John lloggan, R. at 241. On 
October 22, 1991 Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner transferred her interest in the real property 
to Elizabeth D. Jolley aka Elizabeth. D. Joiiey Gardner and Defendant John Hoggan as 
joint tenants with Mi rights of survivorship, by way of a document titled Quit-Claim 
Deed. R. at 241-242 and Trial Exhibit 1. That quitclaim deed was recorded with the Salt 
6 
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Lake County Recorder's Office on October 23,1991. Trial Exhibit 1, The equity line of 
credit was obtained, and Plaintiff, Defendant John Hoggan and his mother were the 
obligated parties. Tr. at 22: 17-25. (Sec also Trial Exhibit "2" a copy of which is 
attached hereio as Addendum "D")- The loan documents state in part, "[t]h\s Agreement 
is secured by a Deed of Trust ("Security Instrument") upon property ('The Collateral") 
which you own and now occupy and continue to occupy as your principal residence.'1 
Trial Exhibit 2. The individuals referred to were Plaintiff, Defendant John Hoggan and 
Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner. See Trial Exhibit 2 and Tr. at 22: 7-10. At the time of trial 
there was still a balance due and owing on the home equity line of credit. Tr. at 23; 4-8, 
Plaintiff is still obligated on the home equity line of credit. Tr. at 23:9-13, 
On August 12, 2002, a divorce action regarding Plaintiff and Defendant John D. 
Hoggan, was filed in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
R. at 243, On September 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Salt f ,akc 
County Recorder's Office regarding the real property. R. at 243. On or about March 2nd' 
2003, FUizabcth D. Joiley Gardner passed away. R. at 243. Subsequent to her deaths on 
or about November 19, 2003 a document was recorded regarding the real property, 
entitled, Quit-Claim Deed. R. at 244. See also Trial Exhibit 3. This document allegedly 
transferred interest in the real property to RaNee tfoley Fleming, Karen B. Cfcimonsl, 
Joyce II, Crockett, Kriste II. Street, John D. Hoggan, Leo V, Jolley, and Rosalee J. Kcclc, 
as tenants in common. R. at 244 and Trial Exhibit 3. The Quit-Claim Deed is dated 
7 
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December 11, 19714, but until November 19, 2003 had not been recorded, R. at 225, 244 
andTria1Rxhibit3. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs case in chief Defendants moved for a dismissal of 
the action. Tr. at 48: 18-25 and 49; I. The trial court granted that motion. Tr. at 49: 2-25 
and 50: 1-17. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court's decision to giant Defendants' motion was in error and should be 
reversed. A trial court may dismiss an action if (1) the claimant has failed lo introduce 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case> or (2) the trial court is not persuaded 
by that evidence. In coming to its conclusion, the trial court may weigh the evidence, 
consider credibility
 ? and dismiss if it fmds that although plaintiffs evidence establishes a 
prima facie case in the technical sense, it is impcrsuasive- In regard to findings of fact,, 
the trial court will be reversed if clearly erroneous. In regard to the intent of a party to 
create a joint tenancy in real property, when title to property is held in joint tenancy with 
right ol\survivorship, a rebuttable presumption arises that the title holders intended to 
create a valid joint tenancy, A party challenging this presumption must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the decedent did not intend to create a joint tenancy. 
In this case, the evidence before the trial court did not show by clear and 
convincing evidence that Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner did not intend to convey to 
Defendant John Hoggan an interest in the real property at issue as a joint tenant with 
rights of survivorship. As a result, the findings of the trial court in that regard were 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS WAS JN ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
it was error for the trial court to grant the motion for dismissal; therefore, the trial 
court should be reversed. Tr. al 50; 16-17. Pursuant to the authority granted under Rule 
41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dismiss an action if "(1) the 
claimant has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, or (2) 
the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 (JT App. 167 
K 8, 982 P.2d 581 (quoting, Walker v. Union Pacific R.R., 844 P,2d 335, 340 {Utah CL 
App. 1993)). In coming to its conclusion, the court "may weigh the evidence, consider 
credibility, and dismiss if it finds that although plaintiffs evidence establishes a prima 
facie case in the technical sense, it is unpersuasive." Grossen, 1999 UT App. 167, ^ 9, Tn 
regard to findings of fact, the trial court will be reversed "If clearly erroneous." Id. at |^ 
10 quoting Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P,2d 951, 954 (Utah CI. App. 1988), 
In this case, the trial court's findings that the intent of Elizabeth D. Joiicy Gardner was 
not lo convey an interest in real properly to Defendant John lloggan, were clearly 
erroneous and the ruling of the trial court should be reversed. See R. at 239-249, 
In regard to the intent of a party to create a joint tenancy in real property, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has stated "[w|hen title lo property is held in joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship, a rebuttable presumption arises that the title holders intended to create a 
valid joint tenancy." Matter of Estate ofAshion v. Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 826 (Utah Ct. 
10 
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App. 1995). A party challenging tins presumption must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent did not intend to create a joint tenancy. Sec Id. In this case, 
the evidence before the trial court did not show by clear and convincing evidence thai 
Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner did not intend to convey to Defendant John Hoggan an 
interest in the real property at issue as a joint tenant. The trial court's findings in that 
regard were clearly erroneous as a result* and the trial court's decision should be 
reversed. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING ITS 
CONCLUSION TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Plaintiff challenges the findings of fact made by the trial court that there was no 
intent to convey an interest in real property on the part of Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner to 
Defendant John Hoggan. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the following finding: 
13. That the placing of Defendant John Hoggan's name on the title to 
the America First Credit Union was not intended to convey an 
interest to the property to Defendant John Iloggan and Defendant 
John Hoggan's mother's [sic] had previously executed a Quit Claim 
Deed to the home and real property conveying the property to 
"Ranee Rolcy Fleming, Karen B, Gamonai, Joyce IT. Crockett. 
Krisie H. Street, John D. Hoggan, Leo V. Jolley, and Rosalcc J. 
Keele, as tenants in common."2 
R. at 242: 13 (emphasis added). 
2
 It should be noted that Plaintiff is challengi ng only the italicized portion of this 
particular finding. The italicized portion has been set apart for that purpose only; Italics 
do not appear in the original, 
11 
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The Knles of Appellate Procedure stale "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." UtahR. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Further, Plaintiff must "marshal all evidence in favor of the fads as found by 
the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305,1308 (Utah Ct. App, 1991).After marshaling the 
evidence, it is clear that the trial court's findings of fact in regard to Elizabeth D, Jolley 
Gardner's intent to convey an interest in real property to Defendant John Hoggan are 
clearly erroneous. Therefore, the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss was 
incorrect and the trial court should be reversed. 
The Marshaled Evidence in Support of the Finding: 
Cross Examination of Plaintiff. 
Examiner: Mr, Olsen: 
Mr. Olsen: Mrs. Hoggan., you make an issue about the fact that again nobody else 
has made any improvements to this property. Have any of these other family 
members lived in this property* or did they live in this property for 16 years? 
Plaintiff; No+ 
Mr. Olsen; Did they have the right and use of enjoyment of this property for the 
last 16 years? 
Plaintiff: No. 
Mr. Olsen; And, in fact, did you not enjoy the use of this house fro En 1986 until 
12 
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2002? 
Plaintiff: Did I enjoy the use of it? 
Mr, Olsen; Correct, right. 
Plaintiff: I lived there. 
Mr. Olsen: And so again, you had the rigiit to live there? You had the right to 
enjoy it with your family? 
Plaintiff: Yes, 
Mr. Olsen; So that was the agreement? That gave you the right to live there, 
right? 
Plaintiff: Thai's correct 
Mr+ Olscn; So it didn't give you ownership, light? It gave you the right to live 
there? No rent, correct? 
Plaintiff: Correct. 
Mr+ Olsen: So again, may 1 ask you, do you have any documentation today that 
would show in any way that you ever purchased this property? 
Plaint iff: There wasns t a pu rch ase agreement 
Mr. Olsen: So there's nothing - there was no agreement to ever purchase this 
property; is that correct? 
Plaintiff: Not to purchase it, 
Tr, at 31: 12-25 and 32: i-2; 9-2 J. 
Mr. Olsen: Okay. I'm going to ask you to look at - what's the date on that 
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document? When was thai da Led? 
Plaintiff: The 22nd of October. 
Mr, Oisen: Okay, and then look over on Exhibit 2. When is that document dated? 
Plaintiff: The 22nd of October. 
Mr. Oisen: So what was the purpose of the quit claim deed? 
Plaintiff; So that we could gel our equity line of credit. 
Mr. Oisen: So you could get the equity line of credit? 
Plaintiff; Uh-huh (affirmative). 
ML Olscn: That's what the purpose was behind the quit claim dQQ&t is that 
correct? 
Plaintiff: That's correct. 
Mr. Oisen; The purpose behind the quit claim deed was not to convey John the 
house. 
Plaintiff; Not at that time, no. 
Ti\ at 33: 25 and 34; 1-15. 
Mr. Olscn: So again, the understanding was to you and John living in the house 
was that you were going to maintain it, and you were going to pay the taxes? 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative), 
Mr. Oisen: So by 1991, you hadn't even done that; is that correct? 
Plaintiff; That's correct. 
Mr. Oisen: So5 in fact> you have to go hi and get this loan so that you can fulfill 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
what your responsibility was to your mother-in-law to maintain the taxes on it, 
correct? 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative)* 
Mr. Olsen; Now, may 1 ask you? Look on that - you've noted that, again 
something on that Tvxhibit 2. I'm going to ask you to turn to that back page of 
Exhibit 2fc Now, again,, does your name personally again - I'll ask you that 
question. Does your name personally appear on that deed of trust? 
Tr, at 35; 10-25. 
Plaintiff: On number two? 
Mr. Olsen; Correct. 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
Mr. Olsen; Do you see anywhere where your name personally appears? Do you 
see Robyn Huggan on that at ail? 
Plaintiff; In - oh, written inside this? 
Mr. Olsen: On the deed of trust, the home equity line of trust? 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
Mr. Olsen; Again, look at the last document on that exhibit if you would forme, 
please? 
Plaintiff: I'm sorry, T sec a signature on the first page, and then my name's on the -
Mr- Olsen: Again, but your attached deed of trust which is a separate document. 
PlamtilT; Oh, Fm sorry. 
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Mr, Olscn: Do you see anywhere where your name personally appears on 
that? 
Plaintiff: Not Robyn IToggan* no, It does say a married man, though, and I 
was married to him, 
Mr. OisemOkay, 
Plaintiff; I am married to him. 
Tr.at36: 1-22. 
Mr. Olscn; Mrs. Hoggan, again I'm just asking you3 do you have any order of the 
court in your divorce action that says that you have an interest in thai property? 
Plaintiff: I don't have a court order, no. T have the home equity line, 
Tr. 39:10-14. 
Examiner, Mr, Anderson: 
Mr. Anderson: Ms. TToggau, you testified thai you did not - your name did not 
appear on the quit claim deed dated October 22nd, 199 i, correct? 
Plaintiff: Not my physical name, no. 
Mr, Anderson: And at Ihe time the deed was dated, you did not have an ownership 
interest in that home, correct? 
Plaintiff: No. 
Tr. 42: 4-10. 
Mr, Anderson: That you did not actually own or have an ownership interest 
in the property at the time you signed this home equity line of credit? 
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Plaintiff: No, I did not. 
Tr. 43: 21-24. 
Evidence that does not Support the Finding: 
Examiner: Samuel M. Barker 
Witness: Robyn Michelle Hoggan 
Mr. Barker; All right. Now, I just want to switch [inaudible]. This -as you know, 
this litigation is about the Third Avenue home. Can I ask you, when did you begin 
living in the Third Avenue house? 
Plaintiff: We moved in in 1986. 
Mr, Barker: Okay, and who owned the home in 1986 when you moved in? 
Plaintiff; To my knowledge, it was Elizabeth Gardner. 
Mr. Barker; Okay, and was she - was the home paid off when you moved in? 
Plaintiff: Yes it was. 
Mr. Barker; All right, and can you just tell us briefly what condition the home was 
m when you - was it in good condition, or was it habitable or -
Plaintiff: No. It was m terrible condition. Actually, it had been a nursing home, 
and it wasn't safe for my kids (o be on the floor and in certain parts of the house. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. So in J85 - 19 - or '86, I'm sorry, when you moved in, did you 
do anything at that time to tiy to fix (he home up? 
Plaintiff; Tn 19 - from 1986 when we moved in? 
Mr. Barker: Right. 
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Plaintiff; Yes. Wc stalled making repairs immediately. 
Tr. 16: 20-24 and 17; 2-19. 
Mr. Barker: Ail right. And eventually m 1991, you're aware - again, we've all 
talked about this in opening statement about the '91 quit claim deed. Did you 
have any part of that? 
Plaintiff: Yes, I did I was there. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, and you said you were there. Where did this happen? 1991 — 
this is five years after you had been living in the house? 
Plaintiff; RighL 
Mr. Barker: What happened in 1991? What - with the quitclaim decd> if you can 
explain? 
Plaintiff: Well, John and I went, and we picked up Elizabeth, and we went that day 
and took all the measures that wc needed to do to accomplish taking care of the 
deed as well as going to the credit union and signing that - the equity line of- or 
the equity loan. 
Mr. fiarkcr: Okay. And at the lime that the - of (he executing of the quit claim 
deed, did you> yourself, sign any documents? 
Plaintiff: Yes, 1 did. IJh-huh (affirmative). 
Tr, at 17: 20-25 and 18:1-9,14-17. 
Mr. Barker: Again, Mrs. Hoggan, if you can look at Exhibit 1 there and read it 
over and tell me if you can identify the document 
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Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative)- Yeah, I can. 
Mr+ Barker: And what is it? 
Plaintiff: It's a quit claim dzed. 
Mr. Barker: Is this the one that was executed, that you recall, in 1991 ? 
Plaintiff: Yes, it is. 
Mr. Barker: Now, Robyn, that exliibit you have in front of you, can yon just list to 
us -just state what it stales here on the front. How Mrs, Gardner - how she 
conveyed her land? What it states? 
Plaintiff; Just read from the top? 
Mr. Barker: Well, just from the part where it just talks about what she's 
eon v eying. 
Plaintiff: Okay. "Elizabeth Jolley a.k.a. Elizabeth Joilcy Gardner and John Dk 
Hoggan, a married man, as joint tenants, but not tenants in common with full 
rights of survivorship," 
Mr. Barker: Okay. Thai's good, Now, let me-you, yourself, signed another 
document, right? At the time of-
Plaintiff: Yes, 1 did The same day, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Tr. at 19: 10-18 and 20:7-19. 
Mr, Barker: And, Ms. Hoggim, T just handed you Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and ask you 
if you can identify that document. 
Plaintiff: Yes, 1 can. 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Barker: And what is that? Do you recall? 
Plaintiff; This is the home equity line agreement that we all signed. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. Now, I want you to look at the second page of that agreement. 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Barker; Who - when you say, all signed. Who -
Plaintiff; Uh-huh (affirmativc)-
Mr. Barker: - signed it? 
Plaintiff; Joim Hoggmi, Robyn Hoggan, and Elizabeth Gardner. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, 1 want you to go back to the front page. 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirm alive), 
Mr. Barker: Robyn, I want you to look down in the middle of that front page of the 
document there, it say^ .security< 
Plaintiff: IJh-huh (affirmative). 
Ti\ at 21:247, 22-25. 
Mr. Barker; Can you read what it says on the security line there on this document 
you ail signed? 
Plaintiff: Yes. "This agreement is secured by a deed of trust security instrument 
upon property> the collateral, which you own, and now occupy, and continue to 
occupy as your principal residence." 
Mr. Barker: So you, and John, and Mis. Gardner at that time signed this document 
stating that all three of you owned this properly, right? 
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Plaintiff: Uh-hah (affirmative), 
Mr. Barker; And again, this was done on the date that you went in-
Plaintiff: October 22^. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And the other defendants in this matter, John's siblings, did 
they sign off on this document at ail? 
Plaintiff: No, They were not there. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And once you signed this document, were you able to get a 
home equity line of credit? 
Plaintiff: Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr, Barker: Okay. 
Plaintiff: Yeah. 
Mr. Rarkcr: And under the home equity line of credit, were you obligated to pay 
money if you borrow money? Were you obligated on there to pay the money 
back? 
Plaintiff: Absolutely, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Tr.at22: 1-25. 
Mr, Barker: Okay. And do you know as of today - and that's the second 
document there with this group. 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Barker: Do you know today if there's still any money owing to America First 
Credit Union? 
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PiainlilT: Yes, there is. 
Mr* Barker: And-
Plaintiff; There's - i^s $ I1,84433 as of last monlh. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And again, if something were to happen to Mr, Hoggan -
Plaintiff: Uhbhuh (affirmative)* I am responsible for that 
Mr. Barker; You'd have to pay; is that right? 
Plaintiff: Uh-hnh (affirmative), yes. 
Mr. Barker; And you're not living in the house anymore, correct? 
Plaintiff; No, Tin not. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And did Mrs. Gardner pay any money on this loan? 
Plaintiff; No, she did not. 
Mr. Barker: And then can you tell the court - tell us the reason - what was the 
reason you had to go and get a home equity line of credit for the Third Avenue 
property? What was your purpose in doing that? 
Plaintiff: We needed to make fiirtlier improvements to the home. That's why we 
did that 
Tr.at23: 1-25, 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And so from '86 up to '91, was it - if I recall your testimony* 
you had been making steady improvement, bul you needed more extensive money 
for more improvements; is that correct? 
Plaintiff: That's correct, 
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Mr. Barker: And just lo -just again just - the home was a - what? Was it a rest 
home? Is that what it was? 
Plaintiff: Yes, Ft had been a nursing home. It needed - well, actually, you know, 
led us to the equity line and why we needed so much at one time was that it 
needed a new roof really bad. I mean, it was past that point We needed to put a 
roof on immediately and make some immediate repairs. 
Mr. Barker; Okay, and so there - it t\c<:6c6 a new root? Ft needed some extensive 
repairs; is that right? 
Plaintiff: IJh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Barker: So yon were- were you continuously borrowing from this home 
equity line or -
Plaintiff: Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). We topped it our right away, and then 
continued to make -
Mr. Barker: Okay. Weil, did you have a job during this time, 1986 to 2002? 
Plaintiff*: Yes. 
Mr. Barker: During that period, were you working? 
Plaintiff: Yeah. 1 worked the full Jength of the marriage - the full 24 years I have 
held a job. Part time most of the time, 
Tr. at 24: 1-25. 
Plaintiff: 1 didn't, you know, go full lime until my kids were more in high school. 
My oldest was in high school, and so I always brought in an income and 
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contributed. All of that went into a joint checking account where John and I 
shared, and ail of my income, which I calculated, was over $280,000 from 1985 
through 2002, it was contributed into that income, which a good deal of that went 
into the home as well. 
Mr. Darker; Okay. Was there any -1 guess, you call it sweat equity also, and did 
you -
Pkiinti fi\ Absolutely, 
Mr. Barker: - work on the house without paying -
Plaintiff: Absolutely* 
Mr. Barker: Okay. Can you just toll the Court some of the things you did on -
Plaintiff: Uh-huh {affirmative), sure. On my own, I was - 1 wallpapered, I 
painted walls, 1 painted trim, T I'm a seamstress, and so I furnished the home 
with draperies, and curtains, and blinds that would have cost thousands of dollars 
—- up to thousands of dollars. When - of eouinsc, you know, being a female and I 
can't do everything on my own. Of course, I assisted John with all the cleanup, 
preparations. We worked elbow-lo-elbow -
Mi\ Backer: Okay. 
Plaintiff; -- on most of the things that happened in that home, Elbow - to-clbow. 
Tr. at 25: 1-25. 
Mr. Barker: Now, since this was rest home, did you was there like sprinklers 
Plaintiff; Oh* it was - yes. When we first moved in, it was in terrible condition. 
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It looked somewhat - the floors were like what you would sec in an old warehouse 
or something - in a - I'm trying to think what - old K-Mart is what comes to 
mind. BultiJes, hundreds of tiles, and we had to scrape those off with spackte 
knives, I guess, IheyVe called, I don't know. And we scraped all those off, and 
then lho.se had all bee glued down. And then there was like a particle hoard, and 
we had to break that up, Then wc - when we broke that, that had all been nailed 
— or and stapled down. So there were thousands of those hi the Jloor, and we had 
to pull those off with pliers., and there was tar paper in between these layers as 
well. And so having to be very careful so that wc could preserve the hardwood 
floors, which we eventually finished, 
Mr. Barker: Now, you I think you testified thai you put a lot of money into Ihis -
fixing this house up, mid you had, of course, had to pay Ihe home equity line back? 
Plaintiff: IJh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr- Barker: Did any of the other defendants, besides John, in this matter-did Ihey 
help on any of these improvements or did they contribute money toward this 
house at all? 
Tr+at26: 1-24. 
Mr. Barker; Did any of the other defendants in this matter - the - John's siblings, 
did they give you any money or contribute toward 
Plaintiff: None,, no. 
Mr+ Barker: Did they come help do any of the — 
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Plaintiff: No. 
Mi". Barker; - sweat equity work? 
Plaintiff: No, none. John and 1 - Ibis came from all of our own money. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And the house, 1 assume, had taxes due on it? Who would pay 
the property taxes on the home? 
Piamtiff; llie property taxes came from John %nd L 
Mr. Barker; Did you have any homeowner's insurance or anything on the house? 
Plaintiff: Yes, we did, 
Mr. Barker: And you maintained - you and JoJm maintained that? 
Plaintiff; Yes, we did. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And did John ever tell you ever that there was a prior quit 
claim deed prior io the 1991 quit claim deed that gave John joint tenancy with 
lights of survivorship? 
Plaintiff: No- Td never heard of anything like this or seen anything about that 
until 2005, I think an attorney of mine had told me about it 
Mr. Barker: Okay, tSo you never - that was never brought i\p at all? 
Tr+at 27:1-25. 
Plaintiff: Never. 
Mr. Barker; Your Honor, my last exhibit here. I tliink this is one of the 
defendant's exhibits as welL Robyn, 1 just showed you what's been marked as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 and ask you if you can identify that exhibit 
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Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative), yes. If s a quit claim deed. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, and this is a quitclaim deed that was recorded in November of 
2003; is that right? 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Barker: Okay, but you see when it was drawn up or signed by Mis. Gardner 
down below, that was December of 1978, correct? 
Plaintiff: That's correct. 
Mr. Barker: Robyn, when'5 the fust time you saw this Exhibit 3, this deed? 
Plaintiff: In 2005, 
Tr. at 28:1-13,23-25. 
Mr. Barker: And you had already filed for divorce by 2005 when you first saw 
this, right? 
Plaintiff: Yes, in 2002. 
Mr. Barker: From 1986 whea you moved in up until 2005, did you even hear any 
talk about there was another deed, or the house was going to be awarded to 
somebody else or -
Plaintiff: Never. 
Mr. Barker: Did you and John ever have any conversations about the house and 
how it was going to be - who was going to be the owner of the house? 
Plaintiff: Yes. I always expressed a, you know, worry. Tm a worrier by nature. 
I'm born that way. 1 worry about everything and because - you know, I jusl - 1 
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would express that to him, and he would reassure me. and smooth my head, and 
tell me thai it's okay, The home is ours, it's set up that way. My mom has taken 
care of that, and you don't need to worry about it. 
Tr.at29: 1-17+ 
Mr, Olsen: Did you ever pay any rent? 
Plaintiff: It wasn't - that was no[ ever set up for us, Our -
Mi\ Olsen; So what was the agreement? 
Plaintiff: The agreement was that we improve the home. 
Mr+ Olson; Okay, and so -
Plaintiff: And improve her assets as well as ours, 
Mr. Olsen; And, in fact, this house was placed for sale at one time. Do you 
remember that? 
Plaintiff; Of course. 
Mr. Olsen: And what was the understanding if that house sold? 
Tr. at 32:3-8,22-25. 
Plaintiff; That we would split. 
Mr. Olsen: So your understanding was ihal it was going to be a split? You didn't 
understand it was going to be a third to you, and thai the two-thirds to your molhei-in 
law? 
Plaintiff: That was never told to me, no. 
Mr* Olsen: So again, that was again to be further compensation for what you had 
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done to the house; is thai correct? 
riainliff: Yes, With us putting all of our incomes into lU of course. 
Tr,at33:i~9 
Mr. Oisen; Do you have anything to date, Mrs* Hoggan, that would basically show 
this Court that you own this property? 
Plaintiff; The only thing 1 have to show is an equity line and a deed, 
Tr. at 40: 8-11. 
Mr+ Anderson; You testified that - or you read the lines that stated that you 
owned and occupied the property? 
Plaintiff: IJh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr, Anderson: Isn't ii true, Mrs- Iloggan, at the time you signed this home equity 
line of credit that you did not own the property? 
Plaintiff: We owned the property. The deed had just been changed and it was into 
our names now, 
Mr. Anderson: Was it in it wasn't into your mime, though, correet? 
Tr. at 42: 16-25. 
Plaintiff; John Hoggan. 
Mr. Anderson: It was in John's name? 
Plaintiff: Elizabeth and John, yes. 
Mr. Anderson: And not yours? 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
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Mr. Anderson: You testified that the house was actually listed to be sold, correct? 
Plaintiff: At one time. 
Mr. Anderson: And that the proceeds from the sale of the house would have been 
split? 
Plaintiff: Yes. 
Mr, Anderson: Who would have been the recipients of the proceeds? 
Plaintiff: John and I, and -- would have split and Betty - or Elizabeth. 
Mr, Anderson: And, in fact, the listing occurred in approximately 1995, correct? 
Plaintiff: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Tr.al43: 1-5,25 and 44:1-11. 
Mr. Barker: And again, I want to -1 tliink we're just a little confused here. Inere 
was never an agreement - you said there was never an agreement for you to 
purciiase the house, hut you were going lo get the line of credit, fix it up, and then 
sale the house, but thai never - you never did sell it? 
Plaintiff: No. 
Tr. at 45: 20-25. 
Mr. Darker; Do you know why that never happened? 
Plaintiff: We fell in love with the home. We fell in love with the home, and his 
mom knew it. And she was okay with it, and we just stayed. 
Mr. Barker: Okay and - okay. So you didn't - and you kept - did you keep 
making improvements on the home from -
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Plaintiff; Yes. Wc continued. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, And again, 1 think you misstated this, but 1 don't how much 
do you think of yourself of putting into this house over those years? How much 
money? 
Plaintiff: i have - all my W-2's 1 have figured over $ 180,000. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And again, that doesn't include the sweat equity also, right? 
Plaintiff: No, thai does not 
Tr. at 46: 1-15. 
Additionally, the only three exhibits admitted at trial do not support the finding. 
See Trial Exhibits 1-3. These exhibits and the relevant testimony will be discussed hi 
more detail below. 
* * * 
The marshaled evidence simply does not support the contested finding of the trial 
court, and subsequently its ultimate conclusion. A Quit Claim Deed was executed on 
October 22, 1991, showing Elizabeth D. Jolley aka Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner as 
grantor and John D. Tloggan as Grantee. See Exhibit 1. The Quit Claim deed states that 
the grantor and grantee would hold the real property described therein as "joint tenants, 
but not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship." Id. This deed was 
properly recorded on October 23,1991, with the Salt Lake County Recorders Office. Id. 
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Defendants argue that an earlier Quit Claim Deed, appearing lo be dated December 11, 
1978, but not recorded until November 19, 2003 controls. Sec Exhibit 3. However, there 
was no delivery of that deed 
The Utah Supreme Court .stated "[t]he rule is well settled that a deed, to bo 
operative an a transfer of the ownership of land, or an interest or estate therein, must be 
delivered." Wiggillv. Cheney, 597 R2d 1351, 1352 (Utah 1979). In addition, "[t]ne 
recording of a deed raises a presumption of delivery, which presumption is entitled to 
great and controlling weight and which can only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence." Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, 413 l\2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966). 
Utah Code is also clear in this regard and supports the conclusion that the 1991 deed 
controls. Specifically, "[a] recorded document creates the following presumptions 
regarding title to the real property affected: (a) the document is genuine and was executed 
voluntarily by the person purporting to execute it; (d) delivery occurred notwithstanding 
any lapse of time between dates on the document and the date of recording," Utah Code 
Ann. Section 57-4a-4(l)(a) and (d). However, despite the above section, "jejach 
document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent 
purchaser, if (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." Utah Code 
Ann. Section 57-3-103(2). Further, "nondcl ivcry is presumed i f the grantor retains 
possession of the deed." David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman 
on Utah Real Property Law (521 (Lexis Law Publishing 1999) (citing to Controlled 
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Receivables, Inc., 413 P.2d 807 tint! Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah, 348 P.2d 930 
{Utah I960)). 
Consider the fads in Fuller, In that case, a husband and wife had decided to 
divorce. See Fuller, 348 l\2d 930, As part of the divorce, the husband was to convey 
real property to his wife. Sec Id, The husband executed a deed and left it with his 
attorney. See Id. For reasons not on the record, the divorce never occurred and the deed 
remained with the husband's attorney. See Id. The wife later died and the attorney 
provided the deed to her son. See Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that in the 
circumstances of that case "that the recording of the deed by her son alter the wife's 
death, wliich sou had obtained after her death from the attorney, was not a valid delivery, 
and that the court did not err in linding that there had been no effective delivery." Id. 
Similarly here, the later recordation of the December J I, 1978 deed cannot create 
delivery and as a result, the October 22,1991 deed controls. After Elizabeth D. Joilcy 
Gardner's death, presumably one or several individuals discovered the 1978 deed and 
then recorded the same. Sec Trial Exhibit 3. Plaintiff had never seen the 1978 deed until 
2005. Ti\ at 2,1:23-25 and 29: 4-7. This delayed act in recordation cannot now establish 
delivery of the December 11,1978 deed. See Utah Code Ann. Sections 57-4a-4(l)(a) 
and 57-3-103. As a result, it cannot be used to invalidate the October 22, 1991 deed that 
was properly recorded on October 23,1991. See Id, and Trial Exhibits 1 and 3. This is 
true, especially in light of the instruction provided by the Utah Supreme Court that "[t]hc 
recording of a deed raises a presumption of ddive^ which presumption is entitled to 
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great and controlling weight and which can only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence." Controlled Receivables, Inc., 413 P.2d at 809. Utah Code Ann. Sections 57-
3-103 and 57~4a-4 also clearly establish that the December 11 > 1978 deed is void as to the 
subsequent property interest conveyed in the October 22, 1991 ikud by Defendant John 
Hoggan, and that the October 22,1991 deed is presumed to be valid, executed voluntarily 
and delivered, as it was properly recorded before the December 11,1978 deed. 
When the equity line of credit was obtained, Plaintiff, Defendant John Hoggan and 
his mother were the obligated parties. Tr. at 22; 17-19, 23: 4-13 and Trial Exhibit 2. 
That document states "[fjhis Agreement is secured by a Deed of Trust ("Security 
Instrument") upon property ("The Collateral") which you own and now occupy and 
continue to occupy as your principal residence," Trial Hxhibit 2. The individuals 
referred to were Plaintiff; Defendant Jolin Hoggan and Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner. Sec 
Trial Exhibit 2 and Tr. at 22: 7-10. Clearly, this document shows that a property interest 
was given, in fact it was required. Trial Hxhibit 2. To allow the trial court's ruling to 
stand will essentially sanction fraud against the lender. Further, it would create an 
inequitable situation between Plaintiff and Defendants. Specifically, at the time of trial 
there was still a balance due and owing on the home equity line of credit. Tr. at 23; 4-13. 
Plaintiff is still obligated on the home equity line of credit, but under the trial court's 
ruling, she has no interest in the real property. Tr. at 23:9-13 and R. at 247. 
Because the documcntaiy evidence does not support the trial court's finding* the 
only evidence that could be considered as supporting the trial court's finding is the 
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testimony of Plaintiff herself. Plaintiff stated in lier testimony that there was no purchase 
agreement in regard to the real property at issue. See Tr. at 32: 15-21. I lowevcr, a 
purchase agreement is not required to show that a property interest was conveyed lo 
Defendant John Hoggan; the 1991 deed shows the conveyance of the interest. Sec Trial 
Exhibit 1. Plaintiff also testified that the purpose of the 1991 deed was lo allow Plaintiff, 
Defendant John Hoggan and Elizabeth Dh Jollcy Gardner to acquire the home equity line 
of credit, See Tr. at 34:6-12, This is true; the 15)91 deed did allow them lo obtain the line 
of credit. However, in order to effectuate that acquisition, a property interest had to be, 
and was, conveyed to Defendant John Hoggan. See Tr. at 34:6-12 and Trial Exhibits 1 
and 2. The two purposes cannot be separated from each other. Tills situation could be 
considered similar to that of an individual who sells real property to a buyer in exchange 
for a certain sum of money. When asked why that seller sold the real property a potential 
answer may be because the seller wished to obtain a certain amount of money in return. 
While the stated purpose may have been to obtain money, an interest in the property was 
conveyed in exchange. The conveyance of the real propcity interest and ihe desire to 
obtain the money in exchange are inseparable. So too here, the goal may have been lo 
obtain an equity line of credit and repair the residence, but an interest was conveyed to 
achieve this goal and lo try to separate the interest from the goal is nonsensical, ft Ls 
important to note as well that the home equity loan was obtained in part to make needed 
repairs to the real property. Tr. at 23: 20-25 and 24:1-19. Had Defendant John Hoggan 
passed away before Elizabeth n, JoILey Gardner, she would have taken his interest in the 
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real property and been the sole beneficiary of the repairs to the real property. See Trial 
Exhibit L 
Further, the following exchange on cross examination must be considered. 
Mr. Olsen: The purpose behind the quit claim deed was not to convey John the 
house. 
Plaintiff: Not at that time, no. 
Ti\ at 34; 13-15. Exhibits J and 2 statid in stark contrast to any simplified analysis of that 
exchange. Tho.se documents clearly state that a property interest was conveyed. Further, 
the quit claim deed referred to did not convey Defendant John Hoggan the house. ITc and 
his mother were holding the house as joint tenants and presumably both had equal access. 
What is missing is a direct connection between the conclusion that the purpose of the quit 
claim tk^d was not to convey a property interest, Another point to be considered is the 
absence of any evidence on the record that Elizabeth D, Jollcy Gardner ever rescinded or 
changed the J 991 deed. If the purpose of the quit claim deed was not to convey any 
property interest to Defendant John Hoggan, it would follow that Elizabeth D, Joliey 
Gardner could have simply executed another d^ed mirroring the 1978 deed and had that 
recorded, and Defendant Jolin Hoggan would have aided in that activity because the 1991 
deed would have been nothing more than an instrument to defraud the lender. Instead 
what did occur was that after Elizabeth D. Joliey Gardner's dcaths the 1978 deed was 
recorded by another individual or individuals* other than herself. See Trial Exhibit 3. As 
was discussed above, the 1978 deed is invalid. It is also important to note that Plaintiff 
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later testified that the real pioperty was in Defendant John Hoggan*s name, Sec Tr. at 42: 
16-25. 
Finally, there were several instances where Plaintiff was asked i flier name 
appeared anywhere on the deed or the trust deed. See Tr. at 35: 21-25, 36: 1-22, 42: 4-
10, 43: 21-24. While Plaintiffs name did not appear on the deed or deed of trust, her 
interest is claimed through her husband, Defendant John Iloggan. See Thomas v, 
Thomas, 1999 UT App, 239 f 22, 987 l\2d 603 ("[c]ach party is presumed to be entitled 
to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.") Sec also 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 3314,1317-1318 (Utah Ct App. 1990) quoting Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 {Utah 1988) <"[m}arifai properly is ordinarily all property 
acquired during marriage and it 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed 
by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'") Therefore, it is 
irrelevant thai Plaintiffs name does not appear on the 1991 deed or deed of trust. See 
Trial Exhibit I and Trial Exhibit 2, 
Stated simply, the most credible and clear evidence, including the 1991 deed and 
documents executed in conjunction with the home equity line of credit, clearly show that 
a property interest was intended to be given, and was in fact, given. Therefore, the trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous and its action to grant the motion for dismissal should 
be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing,, Plaintiff requests thai the decision of the 
gram I the motion to dismiss be reversed. 
DATED this "Z^l day of November, 2009 
Samuel fcff. BarKcr 
Jeffrey A. CaUister 
Attorneys for Plain I iff and Appellant 
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Ttih-(i d^Jfelml s t r i c t 
MATTHEW N.OLSEN 
Ulah State Bar No. 4239 
OLSEN & OLSEN, L.L.C 
Attorneys for Defendant Joiin Hoggan 
8142 South State Street 
Midvaie, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 25.5-7J 76 
APR ? S 2ffl& 
6&Utf£C;OWH 
PsjwiV Clatk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




RANEE ROtEY11HMJNO *ka KIiNEE 
B. FLEMING; KAREN B. GAMONAL 
aka KAREN 1IALTKRMAN; JOYCE H. 
CROCKET]: JOHN D. UOUC?AN; LEO 
V. JOI ,LEV; ROSALBE J. K.EELE aU 
ROSALHE M. FfASIAM; TH!< ESTATE 
OF KR1STCH. STREET; Tiili' ESTATF-
OV ELIZABETHD. JOLLEY GARDNER 
ska ELIZABETH DUNCAN' JOI. LEY oka 
ELIZABH'ffl DUNCAN: and JOHN 
DOES 1-100, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OK KACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 070902(31 
fioncrabie Denise L Ltmlberg 
The 'J riiif ir, ibc? above matte?, having come ois ocjju'ariy foj hearing on rue 3"*' 
day of December, >t>0Sv before ih* >:W<-™titW Ctvvt, before Honorable Dcni.sc P. 
Limfefc: Baui'jff'fippcirijiP. in ;--srrsOx- axi by her encowy, Ssmud M, Darker; and 
Defendant J6)U*. IToep^ tm appear?^* in person and by h)$ attorney, Matthew N. 0?sen; 
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and the remaining defendants appearing and being represented by Brett M Anderson, 
and the parties having argued and presented evidence in Court and the Court having 
been fully advised in the premises, and upon motion of Matthew N. Glscn, attorney for 
Defendant John Hoggan, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. 1 hat the Defendant John Hoggan'$ grandmother purchased the home and 
real property located at 687 3Id Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, during the I96G's. 
2. Tiiat the Defendant John Hoggan *s grandmother and mother operated a 
eare center in the home and the Defendant Jolm Hoggan and his siblings worked in tiie 
care center. 
3. That To Ho wing the death of the Defendant Jolin Hoggan ys grandmother, 
the Defendant John Hoggan's mother received ownership of the home and real property. 
4> That on July i 4, 197K, the Plaintiff and the Defendant John Hoggan 
married, 
5* That the Plaintiff and the Defendant John Hoggan lived In an apartmenl 
after their marriage and shortly thereafter moved into a home located at 1564 South 600 
East that was owned by the Defendant John Hoggan *s mother. 
6. That prior to the marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant John Hoggan, 
the Defendant John Hoggan assisted his mother in the maintenance and repair of the 
home located at 687 3Td Avenue. 
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7. That m 19S6, the Defendant John Hoggan's mother allowed the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant John Hoggan to move into the property ioealcd at 687 3rd Avenue 
with the understanding that the Plain tiff and Defendant John Hoggan would rent the 
property by maintaining the property and paying the property taxes. 
8. That from approximately 1986 until 1991, the parties discussed 
purchasing the home and real property from the Defendant John Hoggan's mother but, 
due to limited income, the Plaintiff and Defendant John Hoggan did not qualify to 
purchase the home. 
9- That in approximately 1991, the home <md real property was m need of 
additional repairs and back taxes were owed on the home and real property. 
10, That due to the income of the Defendant, John Hoggan, and the age and 
income of John Iloggan's mother, the Defendant John Hoggan, snd the Defendant Joiin 
Iloggan's mother were unable to individually qualify for a Joan. 
11. That in October of 1991 > the Defendant Joiin Hoggan and his mother 
went to America First Credit Union to obtain a home equity line of credit on the home 
and real properly in the amount of $25,000.00 and again, due to the Defendant John 
Hoggan \s income and his mother's age and limited income, the Defendant Joiin Iloggan 
was required to be placed on the home equity line of credit and the Deed to the home 
and real property. 
I % That at the time the home equity Hue of credit wa* obtained, America 
Fir*t Credit Union prepared a Quit Claim Deed which states as follows: "ELIZABETH 
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D. JOLLE Y AKA ELIZABliTII D, JOJ.LEY GARDNER and JOHN D, HOGGAN* a 
married man, as joint tenants, bul not as tenants m common, with Ml nights of 
survivorship.1' 
13. That the placing of Defendant John Hoggan \s name on the title to the 
property by America Firsi Crediit Union was not intended to convey an interest to the 
properly lo Defendant John Hoggin md Defendant John Hoggan's mother's hud 
previously executed a Quit Claim De^d to tire home and real property conveying the 
property k> "Ranee Boley Fleming, Karen R. Gamonal, Joyce H, Crockett, Kriste K 
Street, John D, Hoggan, Leo V. Jolley, and Rosalec J. KeeJe, as tenants in common/' 
14. 1 hat the proceeds from the home equity line of credit were used by 
Defendant John Hoggan and the Plaintiff to pay the hack taxes on the property, make 
additional repairs to the property, and pay other expenses applicable to the home and 
real property and (he parties, 
15. That (he Defendant John Hoggan continued to pay (he home equity tine, 
propeity taxes, and maintain the property as the parties' payment o)Trent on the home 
and real property. 
16. That in approximately 1995, the Defendant John Hoggan and his mother 
attempted to sell the real property with the understanding that if the home and real 
property was sold, that the Defendant John Hoggan would receive one-third of the 
proceeds from the sale of the home and rca! propeity, 
A 
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17. That the Defendant John Iloggan and his mother were unsuccessful in 
selling the property and die Plaintiff and Defendant John Iloggan continued to rent the 
property from Defend ant John Hoggan' <> mo [her. 
18. That in approximately 1998, the Plaintiff and Defendant John Iloggan 
were in aiTearson the pmpcrty taxes on the home and real property in the approximate 
amount of $13,500.00. 
19. lliat Defendant John Hoggan was required to pay the back faxes on a 
credit eard and the Plaintiff was unwilling to assist Defendant John Iloggan in paying 
the taxes due to PJamtiiFs continued understanding lhaJ the parties maintained no 
ownership interest in the home. 
20. That also during early 1998, the Plaintiff became involved with an 
individual at Continental Airlines and maintained an affair with this individual until 
approximately August 1998, 
21. That on August 12,2002, the Plaintiff filed a divorce petition against 
Defendant John Hoggan. The initial Petition for Divorce was dismissed on July 16, 
2008. The Plaintiff again filed a Petition for Divorce on August 13,2008. 
22. That the Plaintiff filed a Notice ofTnlerest on the home and real property 
on September 17,2002. 
23. That on Mareh 2,2003, the Defendant John Iloggan's mother passed 
away. 
5 
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24. That prior to {he Defendant John Hoggan's mother passing away, the 
Defendant John Hoggan's mother executed a holographic Will wherein she specifically 
provided "If I still have the property at 687 31* Avenue, Salt Lake City, UT\ Willi one 
third going to John Hoggan, He has improved and lived in the house." 
25. That prior to Defendant John Hoggan's mother's passing, she had 
prepared a Quit Claim Deed to Ihe home and real property conveying the property to 
"Ranee Bolcy Fleming, Karen B. (tanwnai, Joyce H. Ci-ockett, ICriste H. Street, John D. 
Hoggan, Leo V. Jollcy, and Rosalee J. Kccle> as tenants in common/1 
26. That the Quit Claim Deed prepared by Defendant John Hoggan*s mother 
was recorded on No veEnber 19, 2003. 
27. TliaL subsequent to the Quit Claim Uccd being recorded. Ranee Boley 
Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming, Karen R. Gmuonal aka Kai enllaltcrman, Joyce I J. 
Crockett, John D. Iloggan, Leo V. Jolley, Rosaicc J. Keele aka Rosalce M, Ilaslam, the 
Estate of Kriste II. Street, by and through its personal representative, Shannon S. 
Bacbman, transferred theiv respective intent in the property at issue to the Estate of 
Elizabeth \X Jo]ley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose 
peiwnal representatives are Ranee Boley Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming and Karen B. 
Gamonal aka Karen HaltermaiL 
28- That on or about March 28,2007, the Plaintiff filed an Amended 
Complain t i n the abovc-capt i oned matter. 
6 
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29. Thai, the home and real property is titled in the name of "Estate of 
Elizabeth D, JoUcy Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Joiley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose 
personal i^prescntaiives are Ranee Bo ley Iteming aka Rencc B< Fleming and Karen 13. 
Gamonal aka Kaim Ilaltcrmau." 
30. That the Defendant John .Hoggan and ihe Plaintiff Robyn Hoggan remain 
obligated on the America First Credit Union line of credit, 
31. Thai the Defendant John Hoggan and the Plainti JT Robyn Hoggan 
contributed labor to the repair of the home and real property. The Plaintiff is unable to 
quanta fy a monetary investment to the property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L That the Defendant John Hoggan *s grandmother purchased the home mid 
real property located at 687 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 196G's. 
2. That following the death of the Defendant John Hoggan's grandmother, the 
Defendant John Iloggan ss mother received ownership of the home and real property. 
3. That on July 14, J 978, the Plaintiff and the Defendant John Hoggan married. 
4. That in ! 986, the Defendant John Hoggan's mother allowed the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant John Iloggan to move into the property located at 687 3rd Avenue with 
the understanding that the Plainti if and Defendant John Hoggan would rent the properly 
by maintaining the property and paying the property taxes. 
5. lliat in October of 19919 the Defendant John Hoggan and his mother went 
to America First Credit Union to obtain a home equity line of credit on the home and 
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rcal property in the amount of $25,000.00 and again, due to the Defendant Jolm 
Hoggan's mother's age and limited income, ihe Defendant Jolm Hoggan was required to 
be placed on the home equity line of credit and the Deed to the home and real property. 
6> That at the time the honic equity line or credit was obtained, America First 
Credit Union prepared a Quit Claim Peed and placed the title of the propeily as follows: 
"ELIZABETH U JOLLEY AKA ELIZABETH D. JOLLEY GARDNER and JOIIN D. 
HOGGAN, a manicd man, as joint tenantSj but not as tenants in common, with full 
rights of survivor ship.'7 
7. That the placing of Defendant John Hoggan ss name on the title to the 
properly by America Fii'st Credit Union was not intended to convey an interest to the 
property to Defendant John Iloggan and Defendant John Hoggan's mother's had 
previously executed a Quit Claim Deed to the home and reai property conveying the 
property to "Ranee Roley Fleming, Karen B. Gamona!> Joyce H< Crockett, Kriste H, 
Street, John D< Hoggan, Leo V. Joltey, and Rosalcc J. Kccic, as tenants in common." 
8. That prior to the Defendant John Iloggan's mother passing away, the 
Defendant Jolm Iloggan's mother executed a holographic Will wherein she .specifically 
provided "If I still have the propeily at 687 3"* Avenue, Salt Lake City, tJT. With one 
third going to John Hoggan He has improved and lived in the house." 
9. That prior to Defendant John Iloggan's mother's passing, she had prepared a 
Quit Claim Deed to the home and real propeity conveying the properly to "Ranee Boley 
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Fleming, Karen B. Gamonal Joyce H. Crockett, Krisfc PL Street, John D. Iloggan, Leo 
V. Jo Hey, and Rosalee J. Kcele> as tenants in common." 
10. That the Quit Claim Deed prepared by Defendant John HoggarTs mother 
was recorded on November 19,2003. 
{{. That subsequent to the Quit Claim Deed being recorded, Rauee Holey 
Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming, Karen B, Gamonal aka KarenUalfcrman, Joyce H. 
Crockett, John D. I-loggan* Leo V. Jolley, Rosalee L ICcclc aka Rosalee M. Ilaslam, the 
Estate of Kriste II. Street, by and through its personal representative, Shannon S. 
Bachman, transferred their respective interest in the property at issue to the Estate of 
Elizabeth D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose 
personal representatives are Ranee Boley Fleming aka Rence B, Fleming and Karen Br 
Gamonal aka Karen Haherman. 
12. That the home mid real property is titled in the name of "Estate of Elizabeth 
D, Jolley Gartner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose personal 
representatives arc Ranee Boley Fleming aka Rence B, Fleming and Karen B, Gamonal 
aka Karen Haflemran" and the Estate is the legal owner of the real property. 
13. That the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to Quiet Title is dismissed 
H. That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to remove the Notice of Interest filed 
against the property located at 687 3 d Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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DATED tliis //_ day p l j i ^ 2 0 0 9 . 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Samuel M. Barker, Attorney for Plainli{T 
BYTIIECOUR1 
HONORABLE D 
Third District Cou 
BreUN, Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants Rejiee B. lleuiing 
and Karen IMtennan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a fine and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be sent via United States Mail, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the 7 3 d a v of January, 2009, to the following: 
Samuel M. Barker 
SMART, SCHOFJELD, SHORTER & LUNCliFORD 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorney Tor Plaintiff 
Thomas Christcnscn, Jr. 
Brett N, Anderson 
BIACKBURN & STOLL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Rctiee Fleming and 
Karen Haiternisn 
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Utah State Bar No. 4239 
OL3EN & OLSBN, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant John Hoggan 
8142 South State Street 
Midvalc, Utah 8^ )047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
F9LB* T^V^St 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




ROB YN MICHELLE HOGGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
RANEE BOLEY FLEMING aka RENEE 
B. FLEMING; KAREN B. GAMONAL 
aka KAREN HALTERMAN; JOYCE H. 
CROCKETT; JOIIN D. HOGGAN; LEO 
V. JOLLEY; ROSALEE J. KEELE aka 
ROSALEE M. IIASLAM; THE ESTATE 
OF KR1STE H. STREET; TIIE ESTATE 
OF EU7ABET1ID. JOLLEY GARDNER 
aka ELIZABETH DUNCAN JOLLEY aka 




Civil No. 070902181 
Honorable Denise L. J -indbcrg 
The Trial in the above matter, having come on regularly for hearing on the 3rf 
day of December, 2008, before the above-entitled Court, before Honorable Dentse P. 
Lindberg; Plm'ntiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Samuel M. Barker; and 
Defendant John Hoggan appearing in person and by bis attorney, Matthew N. Olsen; 
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]i 
i 
\: and the remaining defendants appearing and being represented by Brett N. Anderson, 
! and the parties having argued and presented evidence in Court and the Court having 
f | 
\[ been fully advised in the premises, and the Court having heretofore made and entered 
j its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* and upon motion of Matthew N. Olsen, 
\ j attorney for Defendant John Hoggan, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJ UDGED AND DECREED: 
I I. That the Defendant John Hoggan's grandmother purchased the home and real 
[ property located at 687 3rJ Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 19<50ss. 
t 2. That following the death o f the Defendant John Hoggan * s gr<m dmother, the 
Defendant John Hoggan's mother received ownership of the home and real property. 
] 3, That on July 14, 1978, the Plaintiff and the Defendant John Hoggan man"feci 
j i 
S 4. That in 1986, the Defendant John Hoggan*s mother allowed the Plaintiff and 
I the Defendant John Hoggan to move into the property located at 687 3rd Avenue with 
j the understanding that Hie Plaintiff and Defendant John Hoggaii would rait the property 
3 j by maintaining the property and paying the property taxes, 
E 
5. That in October o f l 9911 th e Defendant J ohn H oggan an d hi s mother went 
i] to America First Credit Union to obtain a home equity line of credit on the home and 
real property in the amount of $25,000.00 and again, due to the Defendant John 
[ Hoggan*s mother's age and limited income, the Defendant John Hoggan was required 
II to be placed on the home equity line of credit and the Deed to the home and real 
i 
jj property. 
11 ? • 
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6. Thai at the time the home equity line of credit was obtained, America First 
Credit Union prepared a Quit Claim Deed and placed the title of flic pjt>pcrty as 
follows; "ELIZABETH D. JOLLliY AKA ELTZABETII D. JOLLEY GARDNER and 
JOI1N R HOGG AN* a married man, as joint tenants, but not as tenants in common, 
with foil rights of survivorship-" 
7. That the placing o r De Pendant J bhn Hoggan' s name on the title to the 
property by America First Credit Union was not intended to convey an interest to the 
property to Defendant John Hoggan and Defendant John Hoggan *s mother's had 
previously executed a Quit Claim Deed to the home and real property conveying the 
property to "Ranee Boley Fleming, Karen B. Gamomd, Joyce II. Crockett, Kmte H. 
Street, John D. Hoggan, Leo V- Joliey, and Resales J> Keele, as tenants in common," 
8. That on August 12,2002, the Plaintiff Hied a divorce petition against 
Defendant John Hoggan, The initial Petition for Divorce was dismissed on July 16, 
2008. The Plaintiff again filed a Petition for Divorce on August 13,200S. 
9. That on March 2,2003, the Defendant John Hoggan's mother passed away. 
10. That prior to the Defendant John Hoggan 5s mother passing away, the 
Defendant John Hoggan *s mother executed a holographic Will wherein she specifically 
provided "If I still have the property at 687 3* Avenue, Salt Lake City, UT. With one 
third going to John Hoggan. lie lias improved and lived in the house," 
11. That prior to Defendant John Hoggan *s mother's passing, she had prepared 
a Quit Claim Deed to the home and real property conveying the property to "Ranee 
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Holey Flemingj Karen B. Gamonal* Joyce EL Crockett, Kriste H> Street, John D. 
Iloggau, Leo V+ Jolley, and Rosalee J. Keete, as tenants in common," 
12. That the Quit Claim Deed prepared by Defendant John Boggards mother 
was recorded on November 19,2003, 
13- That subsequent to the Quit Claim Deed being recorded, Ranee Boiey 
Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming, Karen Bfc Gamonal aka KarcnHaitcrman, Joyce II. 
Crockett, John D. Iloggaii, I^ eo V. Jottey, Rosalee J, Kcclc aka Rosa Ice M. llasiam, the 
Estate of Kriste R Street, by and tlirough its personal representative, Shannon S. 
Bachmant transferred their respective interest m the property at issue to the Estate of 
Elizabeth D. Jolley Gaixiner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jo J ley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose 
personal representatives are Ranee Boley Fleming aka Renee B< Fleming and Karen B. 
Gamonal aka Karen Ilalterman. 
14. That the home and veal property is titled in the name of "Estate of Elizabeth 
D. Jolley Gardner aka Elizabeth Duncan Jolley aka Elizabeth Duncan, whose personal 
representatives are Rancc Bolcy Fleming aka Renee B. Fleming and Karen B, Gamonal 
aka Karen Haherman" and the Estate is the legal owner of the real property. 
15. That the PlaintifFs Amended Complaint to Quiet Title be and the same is 
hereby dismissed. 
16. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to remove the Notice of 
Interest Tiled against the property located at 687 3rd Avenue* Salt Lake City* Utah. 
d 
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DATED Ihis l4 day of l^/p*d; . 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Samuel M. Harker, Attorney for Plaintiff 
2009. 





Brett N. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants Rcucc B. Fleming 
and Karen Ilaltcrman 
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DATED lhts day of. 
., 2009, 
BY TiiE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HONORABLE DENISE P. L1NDBERG 
Third District Court Judge 
Samuel M. Barker, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brett N. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants Renee B. Fleming 
ami Karen Ilalterman 
<5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T hereby certify that I caused a trueaftfd correct copy of the forgoing ORDER to 
be hand-dciivcrcd on the V day of / k & A e J ^ . 2009, to the following: 
Samuel M. Uarksr 
SMART, SCHOF1ELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Thomas Chiistensen, Jr. 
Brett N. Anderson 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Renee Fleming and 
Karen Haltcrman 
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Record*! us Rjtjquest Q£ 
j*V- — v „ , ; _ . D t p , B * O I L ^ — = ™ Pa£* fcrfx t . _ 
W*ii rax notJw to j_jpi KQCGtej AdciitfsA^LSff.!:.J5.1H5-^:JJ'^^i* 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
ELmBEfK 0 JOI.LEV AKA ELIZABETH D JOLLEV GARDNER 
o f SALT i m CITY 
to 
, C ™ n t y D f Sfttf LAKE 
grautor 
, S'«te of Dt ih ,Iscrcty 
Lif 
£2X5™ D * " • ? * . ^ A El lZABETH D JOLUV ffiUlWER and JOHN D KQfiGWf, a 
SgSforSrS.orlhip^"^' U t * * flS t C n d I , t S i n f M - u n ' WlLh f l , i l 
SALT LAKE CITV, COUNTY OP SALT LAKE, STATS OF UTAH f«.ld1™o? 
OTHER w o a ANO VALUABLE CONSIGNATION AND TB{ AKD K u / t Q O — : ~ H O L L A R S > 
tfco fcUawhg described trace o f W Jit S^LI LAKE Gjunty 
State of Utah; ., 
C D M E R W AT TIE SOOTHEAST CONNER Op loX 1, flf.OCK 53 1 PLAT "0< 
SALT LAKE CITY. SURVEY. A W ftUMMNG THEKCE WEST 41 .5 FEETj THfHCG 
NORTH 7 RODS; T f l S K E EAST 41.5 FEET; T K S C E SOUTH 1 REX)STO THE 
3N 
t-*VJ 




OCTOBER , A . D * otw t-fcui^iHci nJne !mncf«d and 3t 
day of 
Ste^etl Td die presence of ^ < ^ ^ 1 ^ iljlil < 
_ ,_,_., _ Gri rcEna r * ^ * - ^  -.,
 r « 
} s*. STATS OP UTAH, Cwnty of SALT LARS 
. ^ . ^ , ,
 iJni.
 ai - ^ 7 ° f OCTOBER 
rfuwtad dine b»,(drtd *nd 31 pMWftHy uppewd befon mc 
CEizabeth 0 J o l l e y At;.! El i iabettj .0 Jo l l ey Gardner 
IS? 
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ft^tva^Ri sfitr LW# counsel urw 
FIRST AEEftltfitf TITLE 
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i Kama a Address: 
AMGRICA 
HOME 
AGREEMENT, NOTE A N 
JOHN D F10QGAN and ROSY 
687 EAST 3RD AVEMUF-. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 81103 
lesr (Soe aflfiijoi) 11): 
ring ANNUAL p£flCENTAQE R A l K 
5.5 
9.3 
Cortert aalfy PBrfodfc Hale: 
Las! Advsnc* Dais • 
• Q254B.g* 
» 25,000.00 
* r A i w F n First H < ™ tf|Lfly Line R O K M U Q^dK A o n e m r t . Note, and ™ M r ^ r > r J l n S n t o | w s p r ^ 
5nL »ie"wor3i^^7^TuiT , rwrana r^^ff ld|E Unfair mean Amsflua F^st CretflE Union, CrotfiEor. 
tomSsfi to Lanrf Atotwy. Once IhtaAaraomarti is exe*:LElai*r wo agree to aaAatilEah your A&oouhl wiE2t the GjoHt UmK sfopwn Rbpwa. We agroo to rnafcfl 
0 lono as Ehe teirrtf uf Efilfi oonlracd arc being m^i,, . . -
to Use Ynur Ac&ousii. You can ohlarn advances fcy any ntethnri(a) the Cradf t E IF to (ui[hQJto*M«LtlT01° tf^e. |f aEjEharlsECd youGan.wrtfcn a Momo 
titteck by usfoo itaLSjptfcfat nMbarud EJIWIH shai wc m\\ *npp\y EO ycnu or you can a r m r ^ for the trustor of lunda from your fcwmt Into your 
dclng afitoural. The full asnalinl p«W by usdn each H o w Ecjully Une"oh«&X or transfer vAi\ be adderfb Ihe aulslal?tt|asfl principal haFqnca of your 
cd tha doto o? payment sr Erau&fet Vfc a p npt obligated ID actopt ywf J toms Equity, Una thecte in pajwuent d amounts- thai tine duo mtfar your 
ratuo than ons personca/i obtain imp *.<Hwrfcas tindar tola;£groGtflontc ire VR11 pay Moore FqEtlty Lfyo rtiecte or. honnir Acuuunftransfer requests 
v or you, bul Ef you ntnte gnnfifcfoig d ^ ^ t f c cm us, we, al «iur option < mey choose ntf to pay any Home Equity M w uhunk or honor any Account 
natf. Vbu a^ree to abide by any appEcabte term ano" E^reomcms lo t-flact If you ww Loaji Cftecl<&, a VJSfc PftbfE ^ard, A u t o m a t I^IGJ- Warf i^ss, 
?f utfioF m^BEiK ftiftb&rfeeci by Ui& Cradll Untart torn EIIHO b ttrrtet to access ycKJr aecounL W& mlh^ura adftkEioe amoUnS Is jmmilrod^ 
'mtnbs lo Pny. ^ > B psiyFnefits undeF tiib plaji villi vaty Djccojdi»y io ynur bsiaj^a The paym«st amount cluo te cojiEpiittnl ^ t25*|fc of the unfwSd 
artco owtjig JUI tied fl^rday of eaoh ciKinth,« ^u^tobttwjr 19 gntjalw. Tay^ehta are due antf-fieyiibte by Sre &Ofch of each Month- Tito fErsl payment 
to prutfant ricgativfi anwjliz^ion «f your principal ijaJancfi, You- v/18 be ^^>n advance JI^SRH OF my feqiil^d ohange^ In (he payment; camjiiJlatiian 
r prorflfs^ to pay an EOBA fldv^evcEfiS- *ixitf]dad to you or to any other persmz .itfJth&risod tr» use ywjf AscoUri, alodig nvStb »K EErtanco charges drtcf tn^y 
uirJ chwryya acrcflrdijig lo Ihte ^jHamfiiJt, All payments" rcttml bo made b US, dollars. " "" * . 
Ltirafwe Etefcf Final Payment. DatK; Thft last advance da?& ^ iflwn Es the l«at ^alo tfrail tban atonnces can to o^inrnsd an ttys account^ unless ft «»nH 
E3 ^riooljad n«fJ5ar as pFovl^od In Uds AgyeemEm?. T}i6 JiftaJ paymajir date m a / be macty yoars after trie last *id^^ica dais, rfepHndliig CMI wlicthor 
ay mow than lharequafucJ pnyjflftllt. Tr^ ft final paymuni dafe>ta a iunctw>jj oMha amaunJ «iilvonftodlr fch« lii^rrtst rales, and the pjiymsnl cfompUkxtlOn 
[kNotf osftar Shft clur^ tson oi the iqau- ^ JD!i d^lw to pay the babwee oif by ESic I«KI advance ddUi, yocr foust rftacitirttrnue addttionyl fl<^^Plflesr and 
y paymert atnounis greaJter 1hsn (hat TAQrir^d unrleF th« pten- Vbur piyjuBrtts mua be etiENciettfly Eargelo tlquldale the outalcfcrfcdlfiD balance p^« 
f»S, Ytui ftftlbe-litfll If during Ehcrtcrm of your HWIIQ Equsty LETO J^an you mate rinly ihft joqulred paymwits, ttsvl do not piate addiliorjaf repayments 
hat tti& EosaE annouml otftetapcftia M H10 fast fidvano&d«Lfl May bcrsigniittarrfiy Uwoea; than wiiy pf&vJoEBtisilaticc, >fbu Rcjre^to conSnue niakinc? jMymoftts 
•r^ g* during Ihedw^ parbrf or gxaatw, BirocE l^vjcit the repayflienl ported Lirctirfhs ejiEErfl unpaJd balsncK (gins-sura LEEK* Hot&A hae beap p^ld In full 
A Hi<* rapaymwnt period wEI depond on !ha £al#rie.c owed at th^ eficf or the draw period. 
^OHJKTI UabEe. $\i more Ehnn one person has cfgnco1 or is otter wise horrid hy the lenms oJ Ihra A^foerneiit. Ehffii oach v/iM be Joln«y and seveia^y 
endf-e amourtt due jnriar this AgngHniEwa. , , , , - _, ' (^^"""~~~\ f "^ ^> 
ta «c:purjy as v o w ^ q i a l . ^ ( d a ^ W U c t i pT^erty \* iocaterf yt » H / tK>1 J K " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v r T T - ^ ^ 
S A L T L A K E C I T I ^ U l A n 0^303, • • ^  7 ^ Security Inslre Jtnicnt secure alE future amounts under 
frtu^TO arid «c6uding Ehts M\ ^ rrKiiJ^ i?Jyc.urCredlE LimS.The CoSaierai wiri our / ^ E s v/Kh ftSpfid to IE, areniDr*-f uMy dcBwibBd^ Ehc.Ecourily EnsEnjrnonL 
iy Itifliirancp. propeiiy Inajranco K fecfufred by uo flgalnet lua$ ear daniflgR !o [ha Coltateral.- Fire tn^urafioft cdV^ao& Eor all slrwturea Is3r roqutrod 
: ogilaE tu l3io total available ElnsllB af BH Juatss (/Dgardleas aMeiidor) ht wEitdli a se^sjflty FnHenasL to the CoLEalorciE!? ouW4(wftrjflr You wissS obtain 
Btiuti roc>L!ired inaranne at wurc-ost and oxpenae Irt ful? force «nEH the unpaid b^uueo ofyonr AwatfmEs paW in Eul[ and this ABraesncinE ss t»r-
irJ,wTEUranee m*ty H I H bo yoquErud by u& against [^tf damage If tfck» CoJtaEorat is EFI 4 IJoorf danger area. If required, yon are respansfote for ojiaif>lt>o 
jny JE, You may oblafci properly, tiro and iSoorf liwLtrctn^Q Jrom artjAms you wart vtfw Is accoplablo to NS. Jjyou Nil lo provide EnsureEirtfi as r^ c{iifneKl 
irnentr lEve Grerfll Union n ^ H[lrf.UEfr cost or insurant* lo prottal He K$Lajrfty intorftsl-
mm LbnJt, W CrHdtt Liralt l& sol forth above. Wn ^rti ho? obEigslad to bwwr sin^ Hcrtiic £0.0% E.lne diack or Apca«nl fcranstar lecureai thul wnijld 
nu?p^ baterwa Q? y$ur Aocouirt Eo euceerf Ihe erriou^l of yoitr Credit UralL We Enay olocs lo arf^nRa, iiowavo^ th» fuB amount u\ siich Hoqio Equity 
• Accotinl ErjausruraNcT Eroal such advance a * a luart advance under [his Aszatfm&M wlthoul IhRreby JncjcaaSn^ V^EJr CredlJ l-lmll, > u aDroc lo r-&pay 
?s j u Your Credt t Limit Your cradl llcn-lS "ip rid * l A parEtcular fisriounl, Wev/ Euan doeu rtvoi ualfon must bo sSfjned and a three-day reselssiaft pArkirf 
e any funde ^bdyu lii& orlgLnaf limit can be a ^ o a o d . ; .. . . . . , -, -
niciiil. ^ u rway pay oariy and yw m*y p^y c^tra 0/ larger pe^nonts wiEhnut any penalty, Hwi*m any Sairje/ or addJEkmal paymE?rrts v^ JE not jollcvo 
? abSlg&Jlort lo mate [rio nexl ^jcc^ecSr^ r?slz]N]Eiirn monthly paymont whan due. 
y Siat&tEten^ Eafitl KHMHI In which there Pa art 6tilsl3rto1no bylaiicd OJ> yoyf At*ounl r yorj will iace|w a fe*o nthly sjazefinefu trom U5> The ^al«ment 
ins ^hcr thrngs, « w "Maw BEil£*not;r tha flilncmum arPDUiri you mu*E payt when ynu mii=d pay Kk yoiw cuffitfit pedorijo r^ l&> a»cl your Annual Porcen-
u agra^ to pay U3 1he m\ul™um payawfit tfite «t or bafore the dcra doto shown on your statement. TEt* "New Bripance Includes khe outetendlng 
nee and other costs snd cttarocs according to tfi^ Ayrco^nont, 
e Chawes on PajJy BArmice. The tofiftc diarge » the cast you pay lor vredn. The tinrtiae odrcfeniage MEc docs jwl inoSuda casla oilier than 
rnanoo c h c ^ * on Liach JWW fldvsnca hyolns on ihe rials of [hu advance enrf ^ofi«niie& »nti| tho aovance ha.a bc&n repaid In IvW.Wut Nnanco ctiarae 
ismn tba J,^Ety balatiCB" nrnlhod. Toconpulfl the ilnaneo cherpg, Ebe unpsSd hEilarbCQ for each day s*n« yow lasl
 Pay[nont [or sSnco an advance 
1 yel niado ft payment} fc inulSplM by Ebo applicable tfaiEy p e r i o d rate. T h ^ sum of these amount? Is to ftn&npfi. cliaige feted. The W a n ^ used 
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Chiuga. You wl IE pay *• ^ f i to* °n payments ifl d^r ^r mar* <fe jinquml." ftor fate tee cbo?g«d wHI be -3 %• of H nchly paym CJit or ft £4.00 ml nl?num 
« Maximum tea oha/gsd wW JIOE ttoouii ^5JOCL ' 
'jjlc JnteEosE Hate The Fin* h ™ R varfcblA rale feature. Thtr annual p e r c e n t ^ rale (carjwpwsdFFig Eo ths periodic rate) and tho minimum monthly 
in change. TJie JjrrouaJ pB^entega fate Enc|<#tes only Mernsl and nor olhw cords. T * c JEIE6JD=SL rate for w/labEa jaln advasioee JS b&sad op fee Nwj 
*J Massive Piscourir Kate ptu*
 a irmrfiJj). Tha indo* ]s dylortflfterJ qunFtivly by wwxfiitQ th* NE*W toil S«&ral Ftoaorvo DjennMnl Halo on l h ^ third 
oaoh month fn Jhe pjocodfrg quarts and roundsa El up to the nest
 #5tt. Tfca lntEir.cs] rale on axtellag halanras wJK be ari/Utf &d uji the first day of 
rril, Jufy and Ooiot»n The fricoolmi>jR inters rale wIN no* expand 21ft. in ihe ovarii thai ihe maximum raia of 2m in jTaaufrtd, we have the ripht to 
• tiftlt or to FIBHZH yui* limb OJIU prohibit any fcjjth&r advance. Hoiravwj orwe Ifca- mre drops bo low <h» can of 21%j your M vm h& ^msta lw . Tuts 
1
'Annual FtirrejiteQe* f taEe" shown on Jhe jevaree eide of thfe a g ^ n a ? * $ ma rata In tftog UYF too dale of lltl* agreement lllJs inittat base rale may 
D3ch cjtiarf&r according lo the iflmfentfflri oFihe Federal He^^vn U|scounl rfte. Afl InerHsssi ur dacrease In the tada* wJil Jntraaso or decrease your 
[irjjH «r]d jsay effect the rrantartrrfii pflyjsienl amount 
Cburgec. Our wanusJ n*«:1nkNuri£B fey Et SSffflflL We* arfr Runr&rtlfr waMng trite fee. tfowofj ute hftve Lho rlohl to ehflirgc ihls Seo or a portion erf 
0 bs Hie iulure, Wa s t o rBSwvo Jh& rlfjta to nhHrge faae for slop payment Etrbd iel^r^*d olieote, 
jAr PhyjnDKU;, Wb eaR acoetf nnd deposit |nie jM^rnanb or ptirlM j^ymartls, u/ JsaSs, i:ha£ki3 or HKmey ord0i4 narked "payiueii! In ld!i" wfkhoul 
f QM f^lils Linrfer IhJK- AgreEjjnartt, ' 
It, ^ man Ecriotnale your lint, reqtdrc yuu id pay us sftc erjjiro oulstanriinrj baiwn^e En on© p^ymeirtl and charga ynu osnoin fees Ifj 
anyagc in framed or iiiajejjaf MferBpfAHBntatiQn |JI GonnMllDn w\Ui iha \\r\(i 
do rmt meeJ <i;e ftp^yrtient tarma. 
RCtkui or Inactlort edvattety ?^ects Eno Dol^atB^ or our rights in foe ualk^^ 
V$ Your Mmil. U ^ Pftrt *&iu&& Jo ma he ^ddtlk>nal BXtengioEiB cf nftadlL VF ttrfucc yow creitft SlfnSt if; 
Vttlua of Ihft d^liirty scfitiflasg Ihfi Ifrta dtailftB.'^wgdHcHjiHy baltnv Its appraised voluft lor purposes (rf fhe ElnCj 
eftSanQbty bel led yian will noS hw E*JS lo meet the rgp^yjnenl requfrftbienEff due lo a maiwJ^I c)>aiigc in jraur Nnandnl otoimsl«nciBSt 
are fn dailauft of a fjiaterifli obUgetfori in- <Jie ag-Jaonsonl! ' 
irnraant agifon pr^^nl? w Eftm imposing Ihe annuEil i>erMntena FHZB prwldgd (or or impale our ^oourlty Enifira^ auui) thai ^he vealcJB- of she tntcirast 
15 ihdn 120 percani of IN cradli Jine. 
fU^^py agency fca& Fiall^d us itiaj c4ftti^ uE3d ^dvBnoua would ^on l^rljutc sn un^ala and utisound pradke. 
uaxlnHJin arEruiaf percert1ag,e^ale,,^5 raaojiMl, 
i tbn of Vfcmr Aueoijiit. If "an avan! n| larmEn^inn ncoijjs strtd ttB sEmi^lanriouaJy m iaJaf decfearo In writing agU ovonl to be a default undar this 
il£ Agrooftipnl sh«l! larnilfiAt^ unci sn^Unte ny/ing lo" w rfsaJI irijeorrto due and p^yahl^ Jn ftflC- We may fefUKC lo doc&a*g a p^rtiEittlaf &vat\\ to bD 
aS s^ tiuf right to ch> st\ ht(E otfr refuel lo dedaro an wEifiE to by ^  d^fayh at waJvar of oUF r^J^hT lo do so does noE hind us It a sLrnZlar or dlffer«il( 
ale*'. M llial Hme, we have Jhe right lo decide whether lo rieofoffi thai EMi^i to be a detetrfl, OtJr obFJ^H^ofl lo make H I J ^ H C C S mil etop ai tba- Ismn 
|«Bn d<w£afirtlon of default even If we have j i d na«FJerf yoir or thai ^actaral^ri prior to tb«1 Untc If WD dactaie a rie^H, all sums duo and nwEftg 
?E?unl aro duo and pai»aoSev Upon default, ynu cannot usayoiir AcrajLErSand thodeiaulS could resisll let (he lass erf your htjrne, wfifch Is the Collateral 
neat, gruta fudgnnanrt a f f a i r yoi>. 
iiopj df Ttour M e n «nt by teu. Vbu n?ay {grniictFifEf your ^ caKitinl at any tlnw hy *aridrnrj wJtlun ttoEIco to U B ^rjd rstut nlng any n< ii^ahrf^ng Hnmy 
teks IE» yaurpoBseaisInn, Tt«BisrmSnatb'n iviEl be H-ffBti^ a^ isaon as wo can rtawnahl-y a d tu stop nowadvanc«n fjom betng tnade rtn yotir AC[:"iinl. 
f]p tool Jxo obijgaEed to honor air Homz EquSly l,ine dwefe r«o«h^d fay us befora ttie JexminKlsup hoconfics eftpcrivs-, Iri addJEIonf we have the JtrjW 
qtFlFBi]} b Eionor after termln»lfejn elF Rome EqwSly J JRR r i^scjks iiatad Lsfore ihe terminpfcn bneames cftecErve, 
\i fzqjtiifcy Line Chuck* and VISA Befall C3rrfP \f your Accdiinl is tarminplsd you ^a^B& to fanrnodiolefy refcFrp lo us any Hnmy Eqidty Llnu_chcc^ar 
,J
 c.irdE* wjiltli WG have previously ptowded lo you. These Jtoms fSHiaSn'cjur properly evort In your paassoadorL 
iarroi- MaJEcp. KHD the aUaflficd ssalamctsl for huporiahl Enrarfnatlrm rfl^ ardsKQ1 your right to d i l u t e , a hlEJlng error. 
fo Ftmd TranstCKS. lolophoaie rcqu esfls ior advoilfias, or Uansfcrs an yddf /WCOVfit may be gpiif ecf as roi^ U iFftrf hy \ he ^Etect^OlIc ^und Tran^a rs 
pnsed vpun us by Jaw, Tfrto rcgutallosj may also bo oppllerf lo ^ qwesis made thfough thn "Accaaailne" ^urfta respDnsu ayatom. 
m CQSER * FdrcclmusTG. J/ Hi|s A^rocmfirtl ii>wi/or Mio Security Ins^rUmert i& referfBj to an attorney tor DolSEttrflop, you afljee to p*y reasoriabJe 
?d coi^s^ whethw w rwi a Fay^Hft L1* fifed, H(tff Htt^rrifiy fees and oosls on app«fl?, HE prtwfciod fay law.JE suit la filed for a doflctency ^urigrnenl, 
\\ja wJIE hs ina aaaziu tais the eoaitra^ rate. Jf suit Is? filed for s jtrdornHnt, Wubcr CotiEMy Is the proper ltenuc. 
^Eo. M you EOSI or transJor an iHltrfcsl In tha property cnu'eneri by tba yceuFlty Snctjurriont, we may larralnialfi Shis Apraernant aEid acoolorate thci 
:e o\ ywjr Account, which means Ehgj -all amounts ov^ng to us slifiEl bHComc due and payable. 
(<M a ^ c to pay when due a& .Seo r^aij slate or local tanes 3nd u|frE*r charges on She CoilflieraJ saucing lEils ^raanianL, [f you falf lo do sOj we 
p\i&d tasos and add ^1 aapsnaRH lo jnorj/ Account pa,yaf^u mi doin^id af trw interest ratu ih»r» En effect, 
\i TanrtSp The te/ms of this Agreement may only be aiKJftlHd Ehrauyh tbe clgrdntj of a C h a r g e ^ To/i«c AgreeznaFri by aE| parifes assockiiod • 
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Utah Code 
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration 
Chapter 4 Court of Appeals 
Section 103 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78A-4-lft3, Court of Appeals juriscEictton. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue ail writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry> Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state ov other local agencies; 
and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63C-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(c) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases> except those involving a conviction or charge of 
a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who aTe incarcerated or 
serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence lor a llrst degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody* support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases translated to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote o fib ur judges of the court may 
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction, 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 630, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 344,2009 General Session 
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Utah Code 
Title 57 Real Estate 
Chapter 1 Conveyances 
Section 13 Form of quitclaim deed - Effect. 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed - Effect. 
Conveyances of land may also he substantially m the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DliED 
{here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of residence), hereby quitclaims to 
(insert name), grantee, of (here insert place of residence), for the sum of dollars, the 
following described tract of land in _ County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this (month\day\year). 
A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance of all right, 
title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges, 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of the conveyance. 
Amended by Chapter 75,2000 General Session 
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Utah Code 
Title _57 Real Estate 
Chapter I Conveyances 
Section 5 Creation of joint tenancy presumed - Tenancy in common - Severance of joint tenancy --
Tenants by the entirety. 
57-1-5, C rcation of j oint ten a i\cy p resume d -- Tena n cy in com m on - S c v cr ance of j o hi t 
tenancy -- Tenants by the entirety. 
(1) (a) Beginning on May 5,1997, every ownership interest in veal estate granted lo two persons in 
their own right who arc designated as husband and wife in the granting documents is presumed to be a 
joint tenancy interest with rights of smvivorship> unless severed, converted, or expressly declared in the 
grant to be otherwise. 
(b) Every ownership interest in real estate that does not qualify Ibr the joint tenancy presumption as 
provided in Subsection (l)(a) is presumed to be a tenancy in common interest unless expressly declared 
in the grant to be otherwise. 
(2) (a) Use of words "joint tenancy" or MwHh rights of survivorship" or "and to the survivor of them" 
or words of similar import means a joint tenancy. 
(b) Use of words "tenancy in common" or "with no rights of survivorship" or "undivided interest" or 
words of similar import declare a tenancy in common. 
(3) A sole owner of real properly creates a joint tenancy in himself and another or others; 
(a) by making a transfer to himself and another or others as joint tenants by use of the words as 
provided in Subsection (2)(a}; or 
(b) by conveying to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is retained by 
the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use of the words as provided in 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(4) In all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal and undivided* 
(5) (a) Bxcept as provided in Subsection (5)(b), if a joint tenant makes a bona fide conveyance of the 
joint tenant's interest in property held in joint tenancy to himself or another the joint tenancy is severed 
and converted into a tenancy in common, 
(b) If there is more than one joint tenant remaining after a joint tenant severs a joint tenancy under 
Subsection (5)(a}s the remaining joint tenants continue to hold their interest in joint tenancy. 
(6) The amendments to this section in Laws of Utah 1997, Chapter 124, have no retrospective 
operation and shall govern instruments executed and recorded on or after May 5> 1997. 
(7) Tenants by the entirety are considered to be joint tenants. 
Amended by Chapter 97? 200 S General Session 
Amended by Chapter 250,2008 General Session 
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UlahCgde 
lltic 57 Real Estate 
Chapter 3 Recording of Documents 
Section 103 Effect ot failure to record. 
57-3-1 t a Effect of failitre to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this titic is void as against any subsequent purchaser of 
the same real property, or any portion of if, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased ihe property in &ood failh and for a valuable consideration; 
and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 61} 1998 General Session 
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Utah Code 
Tille 57 Real Estate 
Chapter 4a Effects of Recording 
Section 4 Presumptions. 
57-4a-4» Presumptions* 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the real property 
affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it is executed are the persons 
they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the document and the date 
of recording; 
(c) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by the document acted in 
good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an organization, or m a 
fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his authority; 
(u) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all applicable laws to act on 
behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a principal who was ncidicr 
incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the eifective date of the document; or 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the effective date of the 
document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and Mi 
consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the noncxecuting spouse was not 
required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207: 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official 
body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the execution of the document 
were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation recitals 
concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document purports only to 
release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the person executing it or the person on whose 
behalf it is executed. 
Amended by Chapter 88, 1989 General Session 
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Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or 
juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all finai orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by Jaw, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of 
the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as weil as the award of attorney 
fees, 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a 
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a 
joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely 
notices of appeaL Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. 
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or 
upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and 
the adverse party as the appeilee. The titie of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original 
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking 
the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shaif 
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shaif designate the court to which the 
appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shaii give notice of the filing of a 
notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each 
party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party 
at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the 
notice of appeal, if counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the 
name of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the 
filing fee estabfished by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal 
regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a 
reasonable time may result in dismissal. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court 
shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, 
and a statement by the cierk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost 
bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket, An appeal shall be docketed under 
the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the titie 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal 
appellate courts. 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references, 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the Jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the Issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of centra! importance to the appeal shall be set 
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. Ail statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be 
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal ail record evidence that supports 
the chalienged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a){11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a 
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a){11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(S) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not avaiiabJe to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of centra? importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not Include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel wiil be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actuaf names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person,7 "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner 
and each separately numbered page{s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as 
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or 
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is fifed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appeilant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then fiie one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised 
in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appelant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shalf reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee, 
(h) Permission for over length brief, While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to fi/e a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shalf state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven 
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
draft brief for in camera inspection, if the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to 
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any 
numbef of either may join in a single brief, and any appelant or appellee may adopt by 
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
0) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals, There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited, 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against 
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Advisory Committee Notes 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 
883 P,2d 1343,1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1987}. 
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position, in order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, inc., 872 P,2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co,, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See 
also State ex reL M.S. v, Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 
P.2d 545, 547 {Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable 
standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
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Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e) and of any applicable statute, an 
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at 
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint 
permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is 
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits 
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any 
state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under 
paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of 
the plaintiff on order of the court based either on; 
(a){2)(i) a stipulation of ali of the parties who have appeared in the action; or 
(a)(2)(H) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has 
been pfeaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, 
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim 
can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in 
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of 
any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the 
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may deciine to 
render any judgment until the close of ail the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the 
merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a), Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for fack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits, 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule 
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall 
be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of 
evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in 
any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same 
defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously 
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff 
has compiled with the order, 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a oartv dismiss his 
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complaint, counterclaim1 cross-daim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed 
m support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse 
party against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
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